A b s tr a c t: The reunified Germany has faced an increasing incidence of violence against foreigners. The study pre sented here focuses on the interrelationship between public opinion (measured in opinion polls) and the number of violent attacks (counted by the German Federal Police). The empirical analysis detects a positive correlation between the two factors. This correlation was to be expected in theoretical terms. Violent events, widely covered by the media, are important for both data sets. Xenophobic riots like Hoyerswerda and Rostock support critical com ments and an increase in violence, whereas the murders of Mölln support a decrease in both. Specific forms and quantities of violence seem to enable people to communicate a critical opinion towards foreigners and thereby stimulate renewed violence. However, "too much" violence builds up a new latency of communication, which de creases violence once more.
The reunified Germany has been rocked by acts of violence committed against foreigners. There ap pears to be a new threat from the Right. Whereas the main cause of concern in the late 1980s were the electoral successes scored by the Republikaner party in particular, the problem of the 1990s has been one of brutal attacks coupled with right-wing slogans, making people both in Germany and ab road sit up and take notice. Foreigners have been set upon, people with differing political views at tacked, hostels for asylum applicants set on fire, and people have died as a result. What is more, in many instances residents living close by the hostels or other accommodation which have come under attack have supported the offenders by openly ap plauding them. The result has been a wave of vio lent acts. At first sight, it seems quite clear to the public who the culprits are: radical right-wingers, extreme right-wing youths, groups antagonistic to wards foreigners in the west and east of the coun try alike. However, those actually brought to book for their offences tend to be small groups of ado-1 * 1 This manuscript has its origins in the Research Unit "The Public and the Social Movement" at the Sci ence Centre Berlin (WZB). I am grateful to my col leagues at the Centre, especially to Friedhelm Neidhardt, for their severe yet productive criticism. A pre vious version of this paper was published as a WZB Discussion Paper . I would also like to thank the editorial board of the Zeitschrift für Sozio logie and the anonymous referee for their construc tive suggestions. Special thanks to Peter Rzehak, University of Hamburg, for methodological advice, to Thomas Eller, WZB, for the graphical assistance and to Neil Johnston, Bielefeld, for the cooperative handling of the translation into English.
lescents who are conspicuous in their appearance to varying degrees, not necessarily having links to officials in right-wing political parties or other groupings. Counter-movements have also been quick to mobilize: human chains with lighted can dles were soon organized as a new form of protest, concerts have been staged with well-known musi cians, sportspeople have spoken out in the stadi ums. Yet despite all this, the danger of renewed outbursts of racial violence does not appear to have been banished.
One of the most-discussed issues is to what extent the public debate on legislative changes to restrict the procedures for granting political asylum in the wake of the increased number of applicants in the early 1990s may have influenced the number of acts of violence committed. One view expressed is that discussion of the asylum issue tended to make public opinion especially critical or indeed hostile towards foreigners (Jaschke 1993: 32) . The media and politicians, so this argument goes, gave an ac ceptable face to racism. To begin with, politicians raised the asylum issue and dramatized it, yet this did not lead on to any swift solution. The media, the argument continues, played upon public anxi eties by exaggerating the threat posed by these people beyond any realistic bounds while de nouncing the politicians for their inability to make any common effort to deal with the "problem". As a result, public opinion is said to have changed. The critical attitude towards foreigners displayed by more and more citizens is in turn said to have led to the increase in acts of violence. The argu ment is that the perpetrators felt encouraged by parts of society to carry out their attacks. How ever, a converse presumption is that it was the acts of violence themselves which aroused attitudes in creasingly hostile to foreigners, in turn setting the scene for still more violence (Eckert 1993: 368) . This controversy is the point of departure for the present article, which poses the central question: What mutual influences have occurred between public opinion and acts of violence? What, in the broadest sense, can be identified as the cause, and what as the effect? To address this question, select ed time series recording acts of violence and based on opinion polls will be correlated, and investigat ed for possible mutual influences.
On the whole, one has to say that the literature available on parties, movements and protest action critical of foreigners in contemporary Germany is unsatisfactory from the sociological point of view.2 The field is dominated by politics essays focusing on the history of right-wing ideas (e.g. Lange wiesche 1993; also in large part the entries in Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie 1989ff.), by papers on organizational development (cf. considerable portions of: Dudek/Jaschke 1984 , Feit 1987 , Stöss 1989 , Greß et al. 1990 , Assheuer/Sarkowicz 1992 , Mantino 1992 , or by portraits of activists and jour nalistic reviews of the right-wing scene (e.g. Leggewie 1987 on "think tanks", Schomers 1990 on the Republikaner, Benz 1989 on various topics, Borchers 1992 on the scene in "the East"). The on ly area where at least some methodologically satis factory work has been produced is that of youth studies , Oesterreich 1993 , Melzer 1992 . The latter mainly en deavour to explain young people's hostility to for eigners and willingness to use violence by referring to individual data from surveys. The actual use of violence cannot be explained by these methods due to the small number of people in any particu lar sample who would admit to carrying out violent acts. A number of researchers into political parties have also applied high methodological standards as they sought to classify the new parties to the right of the political spectrum within the prevailing political cleavage structure, with the aid of repre sentative surveys such as EUROBAROMETER (Pappi 1990 , Ignazi 1992 , Minkenberg 1992 . The EUROBAROMETER has also been used more recently by authors demonstrating a correlation between criticism of foreigners in various western European countries and the proportion of NonEuropeans in the population they account for in the countries concerned (Fuchs et al. 1993) . In ad dition to Eurobarometer, Hill (1993) has also used the ALLBUS to investigate polled public opinion critical of foreigners since 1980. Opinion surveys and the data on attitudes and party affinities ob tained from them have also been used in efforts to explain the electoral success of the Republikaner in the late 1980s and early '90s (Roth 1990 ). An inter esting, methodical contribution both on east-west distinctions and on the definition of right-wing ex tremism has been provided by Stöss (1993) , based on comparative questionnaire surveys in East and West Berlin. Analyses of electoral swings between parties are also designed to offer pointers as to the future prospects of right-wing parties (Hennig 1993) . Work of a high methodological standard, but lacking sharp outlines in the conclusions drawn, has been produced by researchers into pre judice and stereotypes (Jäger 1992 , Metin 1990 , Fischer 1992 (Kräupl et al. 1992 : 5, Korfes et al. 1992 : 24, Heitmeyer et al. 1992 : 10, Förster et al. 1992 : 169, Willems et al. 1993 .3
(2) The violence done to non-nationals is normal ly perpetrated by groups, normally of youths (Wil lems 1992 : 437, Willems et al. 1993 , with "right-wing youth culture" playing an increasingly significant part (Korfes 1992: 79) ; however, in ab solute terms, apolitical cliques and groups remain the most important factor (Willems et al. 1993: 30 ff.) . (3) The mostly young offenders' motives are not explicitly extreme right-wing, and tend instead to be fairly unspecific. Lethargy and boredom are a greater determinant triggering off acts of violence than any clear political motivation (Kräupl et al. 1992: 20) . Boredom combined with large amounts of alcohol would appear to be the critical mixture for spontaneous acts of violence (Willems et al. 1993: 40, 81) . This is echoed by the fact that the majority of the youth offenders concerned resist attempts made by right-wing groups to involve them or to use them for their own purposes (Wil lems et al. 1993 : 39, 48, Kräupl et al. 1992 . However, perpetrators above the age of 25 do tend to be more closely associated with extreme rightwing groups (Willems et al. 1993: 16f.) . (4) A comparison between the two parts of the country points up a particular problem situation in former East Germany: a further study concludes that the boredom already noted is a product of what young people see as the "triviality" of their lives after the political transformation. "The sub cultures' modes of living are no longer politically coded by their environment." (Stock 1992: 26f.) This conclusion that the young people concerned lack self-esteem gives a more concrete form to the rather general hypothesis put forward by Heitmeyer in his work on western German youth vio lence (1992, 1993) .4
of decremental deprivation in western Germany (un changed expectations plus fall-off in perceived op portunities; competitors are felt to be foreigners and "East Germans"), and of a combination of aspirational and decremental deprivation in eastern Ger many (rising expectations pirn fall-off in perceived opportunities; competitors are felt to be foreigners). This distinction might serve as an explanation for a greater willingness to act violently in the east. 4 Heitmeyer speaks of "instrumentalistic working ex perience" as a consequence of the capitalist mode of production (and associated individualization tenden cies resulting from processes of modernization), and as a cause of the willingness to use violence by ex treme right-wingers. Although he has thus cited a possible factor establishing the background for the willingness to be violent, his investigations do not shed any light on the social mechanisms by which this (5) Taking a summary view, it is fair to assume along with Kühnei (1993) -not just for the eastern part of the country but also, with good reason, for the west -that group interdependences or interac tions provide the "opportunity structures for vio lent action". Apart from such interactions, he also stresses the significance of "dramatization proces ses" in the media (402). The manner in which they thematize such matters, states Kühnei, can be as sumed to play a major role. Media reporting of violence is said to give the groups concerned a feel ing of "collective significance". Among the hy potheses put forward by Kühnei is that the viola tion of taboos by political parties (as in the discus sion of immigration and protecting the country's borders) could have had a mobilizing effect. He ar gues that the polarization produced by party politi cal debates coincides with "forms of sociation" which are apolitical in themselves (for/against for eigners) but become charged with a political stance and with violent actionism as a result (cf. Korfes et al. 1992: 27 rule have shown that it is indeed possible to gain access to these milieux for sociological purposes (Gerth 1993 , Farin/Seidel-Pielen 1993 , Bergmann/ Leggewie 1993 . Recent work has attempted to place outbreaks of violence within their social context and to interpret the escalation of violence as a broadly-spanned process of social interaction. Building upon the concept of political opportunity structures (Tarrow 1983 (Tarrow , 1991 Kriesi 1991) , Willems (1992) has pro vided the most prominent contribution on the sub ject of right-wing violence. He cites four inter active relationships in the form of hypotheses on the factors which may have played a significant part in the spread of violent hostility to foreigners in the reunified Germany:
"a) the procedures for processing applications for asy lum and the interaction between asylum applicants and the resident population; b) the response by political elites and the change in po litical opportunity structures for radical, xenophobic, nationalist minorities; c) the weakness of institutions of social control and the change in the cost/risk structure of violence ; d) the change in public opinion and the experience of collective significance by stigmatized minorities." (442) According to Willems, the picture up to the end of 1992 can be interpreted as follows: (Non-violent) protest against foreigners in general and asylum applicants in particular had already been voiced lo cally before any acts of violence were committedrelationship (a) above; the local police was help less due to poor organization and inadequate re sources, and the violence was ultimately successful in that the asylum applicants were moved else where -(c); political parties, by breaking with ta boos, helped make right-wing themes "accept able"5 -(b); local public opinion (and some por tions of visible public opinion in general) appeared to be at least partly on the side of the youths carry ing out the atacks; the media gave them a feeling of "historical significance" -(d). All this meant that people prepared to use violence now had a more favourable perception of the opportunity structure for committing such acts, thus again trig gering off renewed violence -(c). This subtle de piction of the dynamics operating in this field will be used as a starting point for the following empiri cal analysis.
s Butterwegge (1993: 18) speaks of the taboo being broken regarding the term "racism", by replacing it with "hostility towards foreigners" (Ausländerfeind lichkeit) (similar observations are made by Willems et al. 1993: 130) .
The literature to date has also spoken of "copy-cat riots", including the report prepared by Willems, Würtz and Eckert (1993: 87,112,128) on behalf of the Ministry for Women and Youth. The reporting team presumes that the attacks on asylum appli cants in Hoyerswerda (Sept. 1991), in conjunction with which the media conveyed a "... 'sense of success4 in the face of the weakness shown by con trolling government authorities", particularly showing the apparent powerlessness of the police and the fact that the asylum applicants living in the hostels attacked were indeed then moved else where, led on to an escalation of violence. "The use of violence had proved itself to be an efficient instrument" (125), thus paving the way for more incidents to follow. As for the people directly in volved in the attacks, the authors speak of an "in toxicating, stimulating experience of anarchy and anomie" (127). Nevertheless, it would be wrong to make those actively involved in the attacks perpe trated in Hoyerswerda and Rostock responsible for all other acts of violence which followed. The report's authors accept this reservation, and stress the role of the media (128f.). They emphasize, firstly, that because of a lack of "firm organizatio nal elements and infrastructural networking among xenophobic subcultures" the media consti tuted an important factor in "inform [ing] and mo bilizing like-minded people and supporters" and, secondly, that the media held out the prospect of what amounted to an "attention bonus for the use of violence". This bonus operated both on the po litical level (stage management of violent actions) and on the individual level ("from a thug, to a fighter, to a hero", 129).
Another presumption made in the literature is that a change in the climate o f public opinion in the 1990s encouraged the outbreak of violence. Either covertly or overtly, topics previously felt to be ta boo (nationalism, racism etc.) were also felt to have been restored to respectability by the debate over granting political asylum (Willems et al. 1993: 116ff, 120f., 130; Kühnei 1993: 30) . During the previous decade, criticism of foreigners had de clined over the years in Germany (Hill 1993: 66) . However, politicians proved incapable of provid ing satisfactory or swift solutions to the "asylum problem" which they themselves had raised and made such an issue of. In the early stages of the de bate on asylum, established politicians had even shown moral disdain for the anxieties shown by people in particular localities. This gave rise to a loss of confidence in established politics among the general public, allowing right-wing organizations to take up their concerns. Thus their political inter pretations fell on fertile ground which had been prepared for them by established politicians. The latter did not devote renewed attention to the issue until the balance of overall public opinion had tipped, and then they were under pressure to ad opt for themselves the interpretations that had been put into circulation by the Right (Willems et al. 1993: 120f) .
In the empirical part of this paper, the focus will be upon polled public opinion, defined as a particular part of public opinion in general or of the "climate of public opinion". In the case in question, the cli mate of opinion can be operationalized at any one of the following levels:
-How actions are judged in opinion expressed directly by the media {publicized opinion i); -the remarks made by politicians, victims, accom plices, passers-by, etc. as passed on by the media (publicized opinion 2); -the general mood of the public, sensed by those com mitting violence, as measured in public opinion sur veys (polled public opinion); -the manner in which this sample of public opinion is reported in the press {polled public opinion as publi cized).
By analysing the mutual influences flowing be tween the climate of opinion (in the general public and in the media) on the one hand and the perpe tration of violence against foreigners on the other, it should be possible to show (a) how pronounced the correlation is between collective violent action and the climate of public opinion and (b) in which direction the influences have evidently occurred.6 As mentioned above, many of the offending youths are described as having unspecific, diffuse 6 In a similarly constructed survey of the societal con ditions underlying collective violence (in this case, left-wing violence), Kepplinger (1981) endeavours to explain the frequency of violent demonstrations and political attacks in the 1960s and early 70s by chan ges in the social environment. The independent vari ables he chooses include the extent to which writers and academics concern themselves with the topics of violence and revolution, and the reporting of demon strations in the weekly magazine Der Spiegel (474 (495) political conceptions. This suggests that those per forming acts of violence are likely to have perso nalities which are easily influenced or led from outside. That is to say, the opinion of others and the wishes and attitudes of those around them play an important part for these people in deciding in favour of certain actions and attitudes of their own. For these reasons, polled public opinion is ta ken as the starting point here for an analysis of so cietal context structures.
Waves of Violence
Actually obtaining data on the number of violent acts committed against foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany is by no means a simple business. What one would normally assume to be the "natural" means of gaining access to them are in fact blocked off. Both the Federal Criminal Investigation Department {Bundeskri-minalamt -BKA) and the Federal Agency for the Pro tection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz -BfV) have remained "tight-lipped" as to their statistics. Writ ten enquiries to them did not get the author any further. All that they sent out were press releases and a sugges tion that one should read the BfV's annual report. Nor did pursuing the quest on the telephone produce any more progress. The stock reply resorts to "reasons of principle", though on closer questioning it switches to "the sheer volume of enquiries we are receiving at the moment". It is not as if the enquirer was asking so much: what I wanted was a simple monthly breakdown of acts of violence, possibly also divided up by region. The search turned out to be a difficult one. At the sug gestion of one of the BKA's staff, I got in touch with the parliamentary Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Since the beginning of 1992, it has become virtually a ritual for the PDS to ask exactly the same parliamentary question, which includes a request for details of the number of xenophobic criminal offences, how many such offences involved violence being done, how many offenders have been identified, and how many arrested, both for the country as a whole and for individual fede ral states (PDS/Linke Liste 1993). The replies given are based on the most up-to-date statistics from the BKA, Via a circuitous route, I did eventually also gain access to an internal BKA document (BKA 1993) , and a great deal of effort would have been saved if I had had that document much earlier.
The data analysed henceforth are obtained by combining the BKA's figures (either past, updated statistics or current figures supplied in parliamen tary replies or contained in press releases) with those of the Verfassungsschutz (either from the BfV's own reports or from articles based on its press releases). The basic distinction is made be tween criminal offences hostile to foreigners in to tal and the proportion of those offences in which violence was perpetrated. The total category in- Table 1 eludes such items as violations of the prohibition against disseminating extreme right-wing litera ture (e.g. incitement to racist hatred, glorification of Nazism), breaches of the law on assembly (e.g. marching in public following a demonstration ban), or violations of the law on weapons and fire arms. As far as acts of violence are concerned, the data recorded by the BKA and BfV differ in two fundamental respects: (1) The data provided by the agency for the protection of the constitution (BfV) are more "comprehensive", in that they cover all offences committed by persons who have come to notice at some time in the past for having extreme right-wing views. In other words, even of fences which are not necessarily political in charac ter may appear in the statistics. The BKA applies a more restrictive definition, and only cases in which investigations show an unequivocal association with hostility to foreigners or right-wing extremism are recorded in the statistics (hence the continual adjustments made to the figures, though these are mainly upward and attributable to the reporting delays involved).7 (2) The BKA counts all attacks using explosives or arson, and bodily attacks on in dividuals, while the BfV also includes all damage to property in addition to that.
The combined data provide a distribution as illustrated in Table 1 and Figure 1 . The graph depicts the BKA count of all offences hostile to foreigners, together with both BKA and BfV measures of acts of violence. The first point of interest is that all three curves are largely parallel, with almost identical rises and falls. What this means directly is that the BKA and BfV only operate with differently wide-ranging definitions of acts of vio lence. The types of action recorded by the BfV do not differ structurally over time from those of the BKA. As a result, it is appropriate to disregard the BfV data in the remaining analysis, which creates the further advantage of allowing us to work exclusively with BKA-based data 7 The BKA data are liable to the criticism that the re ports themselves are influenced by the public atten tion given to right-wing extremism or radicalism. On the one hand, the BKA is accused of "dramatizing" the situation, by declaring unclear cases hostile to foreigners in order to emphasize the need for the BKA's powers and resources to be extended in this sphere. Reporting activities have tended to intensify following any events given prominent media cover age. On the other hand, the BKA stands accused of paying inadequate attention to the right-wing scene, which leaves it unable to classify offences appropri ately. The two criticisms would appear to cancel each other out to some extent, and there is no reason to fundamentally question the validity or reliability of the data. For a criticism of the data, cf. Willems et al. 1993: 6.
(both on total offences hostile to foreigners and on acts of violence against them first two peaks and the violent attacks carried out in Hoyerswerda (17th September 1991) and Ros tock (22nd-27th August 1992) respectively. In both cases, the attacks were directed against hostels for asylum applicants, and in Rostock the attacks car ried on over a period of several days. Both inci dents were widely broadcast with intensive media reporting. It is also possible, as suspected above, that these reports may have triggered off further violent acts. It is possible that Hoyerwerda acted as an amplifying influence on what was already a rising number of offences in the late summer and autumn of 1991. Similarly, a gentle upward trend is discernible before the Rostock riot, though the trend is not unequivocal as it was one year before. At any event, this second event symbolizing xeno phobic outrage in the reunified Germany certainly coincides with, or indeed is located at the begin ning of, another upward leap in the statistics.9
The consequences for the statistical trends of the arson attack in Mölln (on 23rd November 1992), which came relatively soon after Rostock, are rather ambivalent. The curve at the time was on a downward cycle after the peak in which Rostock played its part; Mölln could be seen as having re versed the trend to bring about another upswing (reflected in the overall number of offences), or as having produced a short plateau to interrupt the downswing (as in the number of violent acts). There does appear to be an explanation for the dif fering effects on the two sets of figures, for the fire in Mölln was the first time that an act was clearly designated as xenophobically motivated murder by both the media and politicians, with comprehen sive reporting in that vein for a period of several days. The attack was rendered all the more despi cable by the fact that two children died as a result. Thus the number of offences as a whole rises in the aftermath of Mölln, while the seriousness of the crime and the response to it may have prevented any renewed upsurge in acts of violence. The situation was different again following the So lingen murders (29th May 1993): in this case both the total number of offences and acts of violence increased. Total offences can be seen to reach a new absolute maximum, whereas acts of violence rise to a peak which remains below the maximum values attained in the wake of Rostock, falling off subsequently to a relatively low level. The fact that acts of violence increased at all after Solingen sug gests that the shock effect generated by murder, which apparently prevailed after the Mölln fire, may now have lost its impact. The main features of the curve for acts of violence may be summarized as follows: (a) the overall pat tern is one of waves; (b) the waves peak at points chronologically close to events given major media coverage (Hoyerswerda and Rostock); (c) the fig ures decline after the Mölln arson-attack murders; (d) they rise again after the Solingen murders.
Polled Public Opinion
Although opinion research now casts an ever wider net in Germany, it is by no means a simple matter to draw up time series over a period of several years. In our case, the main issues we were inter ested in related to foreigners, asylum, violence against foreigners, and right-wing extremism. It was important that the way poll questions were put should not have changed over time, and that the sampling should have set out to satisfy the need to be representative. wing. The surveys used here are the cumulative data sets for 1991 and 1992. Three sets of issues from the POLITBAROMETER were of interest for this enquiry: (1) the popular percep tion of the political asylum problem; (2) the view on xe nophobic violence; (3) the perception of right-wing radi calism. The first criterion applied in selecting particular questions was the frequency with which they were put in the surveys, as not all questions were included every month. Questions which would otherwise certainly have been of interest thus had to be excluded, as the com parative values, if available at all, were too few or were unfavourably located on the time axis. The second crite rion was how plausibly particular categories of questions and answers could be regarded as relevant to peoples' actions. It had to be possible for the answers given to be seen as a possible condition for supporting acts of vio lence, or conveying the impression that the perpetrators had popular support. The resulting shortlist not only included questions on at titudes but also questions on the perceived importance of certain problems or problem complexes over time. However, despite the high frequency with which they are asked, questions as to "the most important problem currently in the Federal Republic of Germany" proved of little use. The problem is that an answer category such as "political asylum/ asylum-seekers" is too gener al, as it is impossible to determine whether the response applies to the number of people applying for asylum, to the attempts to arrive at a political solution, or to the violence done to asylum applicants -so the respondent's underlying attitude remains unclear. A person might name this category as "the most important problem" be cause he/she is anxious at an influx of foreigners, yet his/ her concern may equally well apply to the way the for eigners are treated when they arrive. Hence, because they could not be unequivocally interpreted, questions enquiring into the relative importance of "the problem" could not be taken into consideration. A different prob lem arose with the areas of right-wing extremism and violence, namely that these questions were polled only a small number of times, insufficient to be systematically analysed so they too had to be eliminated. That left only questions which (a) really could be relevant to the num ber of acts of violence and (b) had been recorded at en ough different points in time. The only question which fulfilled both criteria concerned respondents' percep tion of misuse of the asylum laws (see Table 2 ). A short time after the disturbances in Hoyerswerda, in October 1991, the question "Do you believe that most asylum applicants misuse Germany's laws on granting asylum?" was answered in the positive by almost 70% of respondents in western Germany. The number of "yes" responses declined to about 63% by the end of the year. During the first half of 1992, the proportion oscillated between 65% and 70%. Following the Rostock distur bances, the proportion increased to around 75%. By way of contrast, in the month subsequent to the Mölln attack, a value of just 66.3% was recorded. The data col lected in eastern Germany showed a higher proportion of "yes" responses across the board: after Hoyerswerda, The values in the table show the precentage of respon dents saying they d id believe that most applicants mis used the law.
almost 80% said they felt the law was misused, and the figure for the first half of 1992 was 75-80%. After Ros tock, the figure rose to over 85%, falling by 2.5% in the month after Mölln. Thus the values recorded trace the cycle of acts of violence. However, once again the Mölln arson attack is exceptional in inducing the opposite ef fect, though it dampened the "yes" responses more in the west than it did in the east.
The Reciprocal Relationship between Polled Public Opinion and Violence
The next step of analysis is to establish what rela tionship may exist between polled public opinion and violence. Popular opinion is operationalized by means of the responses obtained by the POLIT BAROMETER on the perceived misuse of the asylum laws, while violence is measured by means of the BKA's figures on arson and bomb attacks and other attacks against the person committed against foreigners. How plausible can such a link claim to be between the factors operationalized in this way, and what limitations need to be ex pressed?
Firstly, on the measure used here, polled public opinion is a function of the perception that people are misusing the rules (on asylum). One should not automatically conclude from that perception that the group of people committing the misuse are rejected as a result. Secondly, even if people belonging to this group are viewed negatively, that does not mean to say the respon dents are prepared to act violently towards them or to condone violence done by others. Thirdly, the presumption that rules are being misused relates solely to asylum applicants, yet the statistics on acts of violence include a much larger group of victims (i.e. all foreign nationals in Germany). Fourthly, the percentage variations in polled public opinion are relatively small. Is it appropriate to assume that a potential perpetrator of violence will perceive a change of a few percentage points and will change his/ her behaviour accordingly?11
Thus the proportion of the general public perceiv ing misuse of the asylum rules by the majority of applicants should only be seen as the most compre hensive statistic available to characterize the po tential for mobilizing and supporting acts of vio lence against foreigners. A change in this potential, or a change in the perception of the potential, could have influenced the number of acts of vio lence. It is also appropriate to test the converse as sumption that the number of acts of violence could have influenced the popular perception of misuse of the asylum laws. An increase in the number of violent acts may have encouraged some people to state positions hostile to foreigners, whereas an ex cessive number of such acts or particularly extreme outbursts of violence could have had an inhibiting impact on such statements. One can therefore as sume not only that reciprocal processes of amplifi cation and attenuation occur (changes in the same direction contributing to a positive correlation), but also counteractive processes (changes in op posite directions contributing to a negative correla tion). On the basis of the empirical data in this enquiry, then, the relationship between the two factors of polled public opinion and violence against foreign ers can only be described as a very loose connec tion and, what is more, as an interplay which may be reinforcing or counteractive. Great caution is therefore needed before claiming any causal rela tionship. The measures operationalized here can only, at best, act as indicators of polled public opinion (and the climate of opinion in a broader sense) on the one hand and the perpetration of violence against foreigners on the other. The loose, many-faceted links between the two must be prop erly taken into account when consideration is gi ven to causal relationships. Before progressing to a closer examination of the mutual influences between these two factors, the statistical correlation between them will first be tested. That is to say, do they correlate positively (with acts of violence and perceived misuse of the law by asylum-seekers rising and falling in paral lel)? Or is the correlation inverse, with figures run ning in opposite directiQns (e.g. an increase in acts of violence leading to a fall in the perceived amount of asylum misuse)? If the monthly percentage data for the number of people perceiving misuse (MISWEST/-EAST) are combined with the simultaneous figures for acts of violence (BKA2), some clear pictures emerge (see Figures 3 &4) . The data plot suggests a linear re gression, but possibly also a curvilinear, exponen tial correlation. The link is more clearly brought out by the lines of regression sketched on to the graphs. Regression analysis produced values of r = 0.68 for the western data and r = 0.88 for the eastern.12 Greater perceived misuse correlates with a greater number of acts of violence, and a drop in the violence statistics is parallelled by a lower perceived level of misuse of the asylum laws. To sum up: there is a positive correlation between the curves for offences/acts of violence against for eigners on the one hand and polled public opinion on the other. Nevertheless, the crucial question is which aspect ought rather to be considered as the causative context, and which rather as the effect. Did the offences committed influence popular opinion as expressed in poll responses, or was the effect the converse one, that polled public opinion led to a change in the number of acts of violence? This is a difficult question to answer because the synchronous monthly measurements do not pro vide a clear picture of whether, for example, the 12 The objection may be made to the regression analysis applied here that it neglects the auto-correlation be tween the data of individual points in time which a time series analysis could provide. Unfortunately, though, the small number of time points made it im possible to compute a time series. Moreover, the ob jection loses some of its persuasiveness during the course of the analysis, as the results compared in this instance were all obtained in breach of one and the same methodological rule. polling took place before or after particularly im portant incidents. Yet this timing element could be very significant in months such as those in which the Hoyerswerda and Rostock incidents took place. To investigate this relationship, I additionally ana lysed the two data sets asynchronously. A mini mum requirement for any assertion of causality is that the presumed causal factor must precede the effect on a time axis. To establish whether any such links exist, the data are again correlated but with a time gap between them. This was done in two dif ferent ways, each corresponding to one of the fol lowing opposing hypotheses. In hypothesis 1, changes in polled public opinion were suggested to precede increases or decreases in the number of violent acts; this was tested by connecting opinion survey data from month x with statistics on violent offences from month x + 1. Similarly, the converse hypothesis 2 (that acts of violence influence polled public opinion) was tested by combining the data set for the number of acts of violence in month* on the poll data from month x + 1. The results of the regression analyses are shown in Table 3 . When compared against the synchronous figures the changes shown up by these asynchronous re gressions run in the same direction in both the east and west of the country. If violence is assumed to be the causal factor, the coefficient diminishes in value. In addition, the values are significant on a lower level. On the other hand, if polled public opinion is assumed as the causal factor not only is the coefficient higher, but so too is the level of sig nificance. This clear trend supports hypothesis 1, i.e. that polled public opinion has a stronger (in statistical terms) positive influence on the number of acts of violence than vice versa. Nevertheless, the fact that the regression values for hypothesis 2 are also relatively high suggests that some influ ence also occurs in this direction. Hence the correlation between a lower level of polled public agreement that misuse was occurring and a lower number of acts of violence after the Mölln attack. The murders led to a reduction in the number of acts of violence, and the amount of criticism of asylum applicants also fell. This does not call into question any legitimizing or delegitimizing effect of polled public opinion on the level of violence, the analysis simply qualifies the extent and dynamics of such effects.
Polled Public Opinion and Violence against Foreigners: Reciprocal Escalation and De-escalation
The increase in the number of violent acts commit ted against foreigners in Germany in the early 1990s would only appear at first sight to be the most important finding to report here. Similarly, the increases in violence after the Hoyerswerda and Rostock incidents do not really need to be stressed any further at this point, as that particular ground has already been well covered in other publications. Rather, there are four characteristic features of the rise and fall in the statistics on vio lence which have been drawn to attention in this article. Firstly, the level of violence has moved in wave-like cycles. Secondly, the events of Hoyers werda and Rostock did not, as often presumed, trigger off increased violence in themselves, but acted as catalysts to that increase. The frequency of violence was already rising in the run-up to the incidents concerned. These events with such enor mous consequences (most of all for their victims, but also because of the media attention they re ceived) thus had the effect of amplifying but not initiating the trend towards increased violence. It is quite possible that the "success" of the attacks encouraged others to perpetrate violence of their own. Thirdly, the tragedy of Mölln, reported equally intensively in the media, led to a decline in was "Can you sympathise with people who take vio lent action against asylum applicants?" In the west, the question was asked in September, October and December 1992, but in the east it was unfortunately only put in October. The proportion of respondents in the west expressing such sympathy after Rostock was 13.6% in September and 11.5% in October; the proportion in the east was higher in October, at 16.2%. Following the Mölln murders, approval fell below 5% in the west, thus backing up the supposi tion that the events of Mölln had a deterrent effect on further violence.
the amount of violence, and not to an increase as in the earlier cases. The shock-waves generated by this murder apparently dampened down the num ber of acts of violence. Fourthly, however, the next prominent case of murder against foreigners in So lingen was followed by a renewed increase in acts of violence -the shock which followed Mölln ap pears to have lost its effect by then, no longer pro viding the deterrent against further attacks. It ap pears that society may have become accustomed to the violence. The analysis of polled public opinion confirms these assumptions. This can be summed up as fol lows: The oscillations in polled public opinion cor relate with those of the curve of violent acts against foreigners. As the incidence of violence is seen to rise, there is a parallel increase in the fre quency of public annoyance at the perceived mis use of asylum laws, and the latter also stabilizes at a new, higher level. The level of annoyance falls off again after the multiple murder of Mölln, and so too do the violence statistics. The parallel course of these two curves is manifested in the high, posi tive correlation recorded between the number of violent acts and the extent of public opinion criti cal to foreigners established by polling. Thus there would appear to be reciprocal positive influence between the two variables, which is also quite plausible in theory. However, which of the two variables should we regard more strongly as a cause, and which more strongly as an effect? If the two data sets are staggered in time, first in one di rection and then in the other, and analysed on this asynchronous basis, causal hypotheses can be tes ted in each of the two directions. The findings of regression analysis show that the relatively strong er positive influence is exerted upon the acts of vi olence by polled public opinion. That is not to say that no direct causal relationship exists in the other direction (i.e., violence affecting public opinion), but this effect is less positively pronounced, and also includes an element of countervailing, inverse causal impact. The relationship between these quantities can, then, be described as a spiral relationship -though the spiral is out of balance. Polled public opinion can be assumed to act as a stimulus to acts of vio lence; the perpetrators of such violence evidently believed it had been legitimized by a critical atti tude towards foreigners in large sections of the general public. Conversely, a reduction in the per ceived level of misuse of the asylum laws also leads to a reduced number of acts of violence. The weak er positive causal impact of violence upon polled public opinion may be a result of countervailing, inverse effects which also occur: too much violence led to a lower level of perceived asylum misuse. That too much is not a function of the pure quanti ty of acts of violence, but of the intensity and na ture of particular incidents. This can be explained to some extent by the elimination of latency in communicating the attitudes in question following the Hoyerswerda and Rostock attacks, but also by the restoration of that latency following the tra gedy of Mölln. Contrary to the assertion of Bergmann/Erb (1986: 226) , one cannot necessarily as sume that the anonymity of the interview situation in opinion polling will render communication la tency irrelevant as a potential influencing factor. For here too, perceived social desirability seems to have an effect. After Hoyerswerda and Rostock, criticism of foreigners appeared to be more legiti mate, to have better prospects of success and to be easier to express -including to an anonymous in terviewer. Taking up the ideas put forward by Noelle-Neumann (1984) 
